The Struggle against Jewish Immigration to Palestine.

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Author(s): ARIEH J. KOCHAVI.
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Abstract:

Britain's policy regarding Palestine before World War II, and for some years afterwards, was biased toward obtaining Arab approval. A central issue was Jewish immigration, which was limited in 1939 to 75,000 Jews for 5 years, additional numbers subject to Arab approval. Over 50,000 illegal Jewish immigrants were deported by Britain to detention camps in Cyprus and Germany, and this probably affected Arab response to Jewish immigration.

Full Text :

Britain's new policy vis-a-vis Palestine on the eve of the war in Europe was clearly aimed at appeasing the Arabs. Convinced that for the Arabs, Jewish immigration formed the crux of the Palestine problem, Britain decided in 1939 to limit drastically the scope of this immigration. The 1936-39 Palestine revolt against the British Mandate was a direct outcome of the dramatic increase in Jewish immigration during the first three years of Adolf Hitler's reign. From 1933 to 1936, more than 130,000 Jews arrived in Palestine. During this period the Yishuv, or Jewish community in Palestine, grew by about 80 per cent, the high point for immigration coming in 1935, when 62,000 persons entered Palestine. The decision of the Conservative Government to retreat from its support for partitioning Palestine into Arab and Jewish states and from its support for Zionism was manifested in the White Paper of May 1939. Among other provisions, this document set an immigration quota of 75,000 Jews for five years, after which further immigration would be conditional upon Arab consent.(1)

At the end of the war, the Mandatory Government had remaining in its possession 10,938 immigration certificates of the 75,000 that had been, allotted by the White Paper. Although the five-year period fixed in the White Paper ended in 1944, Whitehall decided to extend the date until the quota was filled. The Zionists rejected

the British offer of 1,500 visas per month, to be charged against the remaining White Paper certificates, and demanded that 100,000 Jewish displaced persons (DP) be allowed to enter Palestine. Determined to preserve its standing in the Middle East, the new Labour Government, like its predecessor, the wartime coalition, attached considerable importance to mollifying the Arabs on the matter of Jewish immigration. For their part, the Zionists tried to undermine Britain's immigration policy by sending to Palestine tens of thousands of illegal immigrants, as the British called them, from different ports in Europe and by mobilizing American pressure to force London to open the gates of Palestine to the Jewish DPs. This article will examine British policy on Jewish immigration, particularly London's struggle against the illegal immigration, in light of both Arab and Zionist pressures.

After the end of the Second World War, the British Cabinet puzzled over three alternative courses in regard to Jewish immigration: (a) continuation of the White Paper; (b) consultation with the Arabs on the continuation of Jewish immigration at a rate of 1,500 persons per month; (c) continuation of the allocation of 1,500 certificates each month without consultation with the Arabs. In September 1945, the Cabinet Palestine Committee recommended continuing the immigration arrangements of the White Paper during the interval between the end of the immigration quota and the publication of a long-term Palestine policy, with every effort being made to gain Arab support for this policy. The Committee assumed that if the Government were faced with a choice between a confrontation with the Jews in Palestine or with the Arabs throughout the entire Middle East and perhaps even with the Muslims in India, the former alternative was preferable.(2)

British representatives in Arab countries warned London that the continuation of Jewish immigration without Arab consent was likely `to result in a wave of hostility throughout the Arab countries, spreading to the Moslems of India and threatening Great Britain's whole position in the Middle East'.(3) Lawrence B. Grafftey-Smith, the Minister in Jeddah, for example, strongly opposed the Zionists' demand for continued Jewish immigration. Criticizing the Americans for pressuring to admit more Jewish DPs, the British diplomat commented:

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   The Middle East is for us what the Balkans are for Russia or South
America
   for the United States. It is the enemies and not the friends of
the British
   Empire who seek to establish this irritant of non assimilable
elements of
   Eastern European outlook and dubious ideology in a dominating
position
   across our Imperial communications.
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Grafftey-Smith warned Bevin that requesting King Ibn Saud to acquiesce in further immigration would provoke a meeting of the Arab League (founded in March 1945) `with the risk of taking mass temperature and some patriotic out-bidding of one country by another'.(4) From India, too, reports reached the Foreign Office telling of the great interest being shown there in the future of Palestine and the fact that leaders in both Muslim and Hindu papers opposed Zionism and supported the Arab cause.(5) Abd al-Rahman Azzam, the Secretary-General of the Arab League, suggested during his visit to London in October 1945 that the Arab countries might be willing to admit Jewish refugees if Britain and the United States followed a similar course.(6) Azzam,

of course, wanted to avoid Jewish refugees reaching Palestine. For their part, the Chiefs of Staff cautioned that in case the Government made an announcement that could be regarded as definitely unfavourable to the Arab cause, `the additional commitments of British troops not only in India, but in the Middle East in replacement of Indian troops already there, could not at the present time be met'.(7)

In formulating his plans for Palestine, Foreign Secretary Ernest Bevin had to take into consideration the electoral importance that the White House attached to American Jews. The Foreign Secretary learned from his Ambassador, Lord Halifax, that the Zionists were exploiting the approaching 1946 mid-term elections to mobilize support for their position and that both the Democrats and the Republicans were eager to capture the Jewish vote, especially in the key state of New York. Halifax was particularly bothered by the consensus that prevailed between the two parties in Congress in regard to the Zionist cause. Republican senators, headed by Robert A. Taft of Ohio, expressed strong support for Truman's proposal for the immediate granting of 100,000 immigration certificates to Jewish DPs.(8) Wishing to put an end to the pressure that Washington was exerting, Bevin suggested that the Cabinet involve the Americans in a joint Allied policy on Palestine, and his proposal to establish an Anglo-American Inquiry Committee was accepted. The proposed Commission, as outlined by the Cabinet Committee on Palestine, was to examine the position of the Jews in Europe, to estimate how many could not be resettled in their original countries, and to explore the possibility of Jews' emigrating to other countries outside Europe, including the United States.(9)

The US Secretary of State, James F. Byrnes, tended to favour the formation of the Inquiry Commission, but was very dissatisfied with the slight emphasis placed on Palestine. He expressed his apprehension that American Jews would regard the proposal as `merely evasive and dilatory devices'. The American counter-recommendation emphasized the centrality of Palestine as a destination in solving of the problem of the Jewish DPs.(10) In order to secure American participation, Bevin was compelled to accept the Americans' proposal about the goals of the joint commission, even though to a large extent it ran counter to Britain's objectives. Differences also arose between the British and the Americans over the timing of the announcement on the intention to establish the commission. The Americans wanted to wait until after the New York elections for fear that the Administration's consent to take part in the commission was liable to be interpreted as an attempt by the United States to postpone large-scale immigration to Palestine. Such a conclusion `would inflame the million or so Jewish voters as also their sympathies and altogether destroy the prospects of the Democratic candidate whose Republican rival for Mayor was ... a Jew'.(11)

The British, however, also had timing constraints. The annual pilgrimage to Mecca took place in November, culminating on 14 November. For a considerable period before and after that date, there would be a great concourse of Muslims from all parts of the Muslim world, including a large contingent from India. Accordingly, British representatives in the Middle East strongly urged that no announcement be made during this period. In their view, the strong possibility existed of pressure being brought to bear on the various Arab Governments at Mecca to harden their attitude towards Jewish immigration. If the announcement, furthermore, were regarded as unfavourable to the Arabs, the result might be a serious anti-foreign demonstration,

which in this setting would have widespread consequences. Furthermore, if King Ibn Saud felt that he had been let down by both Britain and America, he might cease the restraining influence that he had successfully exercised in the past against the exploitation by anti-foreign elements of the opportunities presented by the pilgrimage.(12)

Once again, Bevin gave in to the President's electoral constraints, and on 13 November 1945 both Bevin and Truman announced the decision to establish an Anglo-American Committee of Inquiry. In his speech in Parliament on the same day, Bevin explained his views about the problem of the Jewish DPs, the Palestine question, and the degree to which they were related, none of which views were to be found in the official version of the committee's objective. After identifying with the anguish of the Jews as a result of the catastrophe that had befallen them and reviewing the efforts Britain was making to improve their situation, Bevin stated that the Jews should not be driven out from Europe and that Palestine alone could not present a solution for the Jewish problem.(13) In Washington, meanwhile, Truman emphasized that his policies had not undergone any change since his approach to the British Prime Minister in August to distribute 100,000 certificates to Jewish DPs.(14)

On the same day that Bevin and Truman announced the decision to establish the Anglo-American Commission, London asked the Arab states to agree to continued Jewish immigration after the expiration of the White Paper quota; the rate of 1,500 immigrants per month would continue until more satisfactory arrangements, based on the recommendations of the joint Committee, were worked out in consultation with all parties concerned. The individual Arab states referred the question to the Arab League, which returned an evasive reply. Secretary-General Azzam told correspondents that the League had not been convinced by the arguments for further immigration; however, the League's reply could not be called a rejection. In analyzing the Arab League stand, British Intelligence thought that the Arab answer `amounts to a rejection but it is couched in moderate language and the door is left open in the all important matter of immigration'. It was assumed, furthermore, that the Arabs would eventually cooperate with the Committee of Inquiry.(15) Lt. General Sir Alan Cunningham, the British High Commissioner for Palestine, thought that the Palestinian Arabs would do their utmost to induce the League not to agree to interim immigration.(16)

By the end of 1945, only 400 certificates were left of the 75,000 permitted by the White Paper quota. The British Cabinet advised that immigration, realistically, would not cease altogether at this point and, therefore, another effort should be made to obtain the Arab Governments' consent to continuing the present arrangement `on the understanding that immigrants would be limited to those who were near relatives of persons already in Palestine'. And indeed, on 5 January 1946, a further communication was made to the Arab states, who were asked to reply with the least possible delay.(17) Once again, the Arab leaders chose vagueness. On the one hand, they wished to demonstrate good will towards Britain; on the other, they feared the reaction of their people. The Egyptian Prime Minister said he was not unsympathetic and assured the British Ambassador of the great desire of the Arab states, individually and collectively, to help find an equitable solution to the problem. The Iraqi Prime Minister replied that although he personally might be willing to consent, he doubted whether his Cabinet would be amenable. He thought that any response should come

from the League as a whole. The British Ambassador in Baghdad thought that the Iraqi Prime Minister genuinely wanted to see a settlement of the Palestine problem and probably recognized that limited immigration had to continue temporarily, but felt that the responsibility for acquiescing in so unpopular a step should be spread as widely as possible.

King Ibn Saud was disturbed at the proposal to continue immigration without any definite limit being fixed in terms either of time or of total numbers, and he asked for assurances on these points. According to the British Ambassador, the King `yearned for a settlement of this vexed problem and spoke humanely of the Jews as being men like others'. It was the vagueness of the future that alarmed him. Ibn Saud preferred that the Arab League reply for all the Arab countries in order to avoid competitively patriotic attitudes by individual Arab rulers. Syria's President on the whole seemed receptive to the arguments in favour of the proposal but refrained from giving any definite reply without knowing the views of the other Arab states. The Lebanese President, like his Syrian counterpart, insisted that the question should be referred to the League; however, he promised to instruct the Lebanese Minister in Cairo to use his influence in a favourable sense. Similarly, the Amir of Transjordan avoided giving a definite reply, since he considered that the matter would have to be referred to the League, but he promised to urge acceptance. The Palestinian Arabs, who were consulted by the High Commissioner, asked for time to consider the question.

In summarizing the Arab stand, Arthur Creech Jones, Under-Secretary in the Colonial Office, maintained that although no state individually nor the League collectively had rejected the proposals, no one was prepared to take responsibility for giving a final reply. The League's answer to the original communication of November 1945, Creech Jones argued, was designed merely to avoid the need for an immediate decision; thus, if the case went to the League again, `there seems to be at least a possibility that an evasive reply will again be received'. Creech Jones, therefore, urged Foreign Secretary Bevin to put into effect the Cabinet decision of 1 January and to prescribe a quota without waiting for the Arabs' formal reply. The Under-Secretary of State feared a Jewish attack on the Atlit detention camp, where over 900 Jewish illegal immigrants, who had recently been intercepted on the Enzo Sereni ship, were interned.(18) Recognizing the seriousness of the situation, Whitehall decided on the continuation of a provisional allocation of 1,500 immigration certificates per month.(19) Whitehall's decision was influenced not only by apprehension at a possible bloody confrontation with the Zionists, which might then cause the Anglo-American Committee to cancel its plans to visit Palestine, but also by a conclusion that the Arab leaders were in fact willing to acquiesce in a temporary, limited Jewish immigration as long as they would not have to issue a formal approval.

The Arabs themselves were worried at the time by the illegal immigration and by what they regarded as Britain's lack of sincerity in opposing the illegal sailings. The Arab press conducted an organized campaign of jeering the British for their inability to prevent Jewish immigration. It was argued, moreover, that `ships could not approach Palestine through the screen of aircraft and naval vessels without the consent of the British, and that there is a deep-laid plot to give the Jews their head, while all the outward appearances of opposing them are maintained'.(20) Lord Killearn, British Ambassador to Egypt, reported the Egyptian Prime Minister's great fear that the illegal Jewish immigration was proceeding on a considerable scale. The

Prime Minister estimated at the end of January 1946 that 6,000 immigrants had arrived illegally thus far.(21) It was, however, an exaggerated estimate; until then, fewer than 2,000 illegal immigrants had actually landed.(22)

The Arabs soon had to contend with the report of the Anglo-American Committee, which was completed on 20 April 1946. Of the Committee's ten recommendations, one proposed `that 100,000 certificates be authorized immediately for the admission into Palestine of Jews who have been the victims of Nazi and Fascist persecution' and that preference be given to those DPs in the camps and to those liberated in Germany and Austria who were no longer in the camps.(23) British diplomats in the Arab countries were seriously disturbed at this recommendation. Grafftey-Smith maintained that from the point of view of the British Government's relations with Middle East states and the Muslim world, `this is a disastrous report'. The British diplomat urged Whitehall to reject this recommendation out of hand. According to Grafftey-Smith, the Arabs considered the indefinite continuation of Jewish immigration `too high a price to pay for an increasing standard of living up to the level of Jewish civilization'. He therefore suggested that with the publication of the Committee's report, Whitehall should make it clear that it was not bound automatically and irrevocably by its recommendations.(24) H. Stonehewer Bird in Baghdad argued that the report reversed the principle that immigration should be continued only if the Arabs consented and `that no term or limit is proposed for schemes so that Arabs will foresee ultimate Jewish numerical equality or unqualified superiority'. Granting 100,000 certificates, he maintained, `represents a greater rate of immigration than that in the early 1930s which induced Arab solidarity against Zionism'. The diplomat resented the Committee's assumption that Palestine belonged to Arabs and European Jews alike.(25) Cabinet Ministers, except for Bevin, also felt uncomfortable with the Committee's recommendations, and there was concern over the probable Arab reaction.(26)

The situation became even more complicated when the British learned from the Americans that President Truman's forthcoming speech intended to endorse only those recommendations of the Anglo-American Committee that were favourable to the Zionists.(27) Fighting back, Prime Minister Clement Attlee stressed in a speech in Parliament on 1 May that until the illegal armies in Palestine were disbanded, the Mandatory Government could not absorb such a large number of immigrants.(28) In other words, the Prime Minister was postponing for an unlimited time the transfer of 100,000 DPs to Palestine.

Nevertheless, the Prime Minister's statement failed to calm the leaders of the Arab countries, who quickly convened the first summit meeting of Arab leaders in Inshas, Egypt at the end of May. They demanded that Britain completely stop Zionist immigration, prevent the transfer of Arab land into Zionist hands, and grant independence to Palestine. Britain and the United States were warned that any adoption of the Inquiry Committee's recommendations would be considered a hostile act not only against the Arabs of Palestine but also against the Arab countries themselves. Another emergency meeting of the League Council convened in Bludan, Syria, on 8 June. The decisions that were made public condemned the Anglo-American Committee's recommendations, warned the United States that its policy endangered American interests in the Arab countries, and called on Britain to negotiate the future of Palestine with the Arab League members. The League also

adopted several secret resolutions that were to go into effect in case the recommendations of the Inquiry Committee were implemented. These resolutions spoke of political and economic sanctions against Britain and the United States.(29)

The deadlock in which the British and Americans found themselves after the Inquiry Committee's report was published disturbed both capitals. Each recognized that finding a way out was of mutual interest: accordingly, it was decided to conduct joint negotiations on the Anglo-American report.(30) During these negotiations, the British were confronted in the course of the summer of 1946 with a significant increase in the pace of illegal immigration and with a deterioration in the security situation in Palestine. The Cabinet, which attached great importance to formulating a joint American-British policy for a solution to the Palestine question, preferred to forego taking more severe measures against the illegal immigrants for fear of jeopardizing the discussions with the Americans. The practice at that time was to intern the illegal immigrants in Atlit and to release them against the monthly immigration quota. Military elements, however, warned of the dangers that Britain could expect in Palestine and in the entire Middle East, as well, if vigorous action were not instituted against the illegal immigration. `All our defence requirements in the Middle East, including maintenance of our essential oil supplies and communications', the Chiefs of Staff told the Cabinet, `demand that an essential feature of our policy should be to retain the co-operation of the Arab States, and to ensure that the Arab world does not gravitate towards the Russians.(31)

The Mandatory government was having serious difficulties coping with the inundation of illegal immigrants. The Atlit solution was no longer effective, since the significant increase of Jewish refugees compelled the authorities to fill the quotas a number of months in advance. In early July, the High Commissioner called the attention of the Colonial Office to the lack of certificates as a result of the detention of three vessels within less than a month. Moreover, following the sweeping arrests made by the British on `Black Saturday' (29 June 1946), during the course of which approximately 2,700 Jews were detained, there was even a shortage of internment locations for illegal immigrants.(32)

Several days after the Cabinet decided not to alter its policy of interning illegal immigrants in Atlit, tension in Palestine increased. The immediate cause was the death of 41 Arabs in an explosion in the King David Hotel (22 July 1946) in Jerusalem that was executed by the Irgun Zvai Leumi (IZL, National Military Organization, headed by Menahem Begin).(33) Cunningham, fearing a violent Arab reaction, advised stopping the immigration to Palestine altogether. He proposed that illegal-immigrant vessels that had embarked from ports under Western control be returned to their points of embarkation and that ships arriving from Balkan ports under Russian control be sent to Tripoli or to Cyprus. The High Commissioner was of the opinion that since confrontation with the Yishuv was inevitable, it was better for the clash to occur sooner rather than later. Cunningham pointed out that subsequent to their arrival a large portion of the illegal immigrants joined underground organizations, especially IZL and the LEHI [Lohmei Herut Israel] (Freedom Fighters, founded by Abraham Stern). He added that there was good reason to believe that preference when allotting places in illegal-immigrants vessels was being given to past guerrilla fighters.(34)

At its meeting on 25 July, the Cabinet rejected the High Commissioner's advice to halt immigration to Palestine, and the idea of deporting illegal immigrants was never even discussed. At that meeting, Norman Brook, head of the British delegation negotiating with the Americans on the report of the Anglo-American Committee, reported that the American delegation had agreed to adopt the provincial-autonomy plan for Palestine (known as the `Morrison-Grady plan'), which the British favoured. This plan assured the British of the continuation of the Mandate, including the use of Palestine as a base for their armed forces.(35) The ministers did not wish to jeopardize this important achievement by taking extreme anti-immigration measures, which were liable to provoke Washington and arouse American public opinion. Moreover, the problem of illegal immigration would come to an end with the inception of the provincial-autonomy plan, which provided for the entry of 100,000 Jewish displaced persons.(36)

Only a few days after its decision not to escalate measures against the illegal sailings, the Cabinet was compelled to review its position in light of the detention of a ship that had sailed from Yugoslavia with almost 2,700 illegal immigrants on board. There were also reports of another ship, with 500 illegal immigrants aboard, that was scheduled to arrive soon afterwards. The Cabinet was inclined to accept the advice of the Prime Minister, then attending the Peace Conference in Paris, to release the women and children but to hold the men for an unlimited period of time. The ministers preferred this course of action to the chiefs of Staff's recommendation to deport the illegal immigrants either to Europe or to detention centres in Cyprus or Cyrenaica. Still, they chose not to make any final decision on the matter until the Prime Minister was apprised of the dangers to be expected should Britain be involved in incidents with both the Arabs and the Jews at the same time. The military stressed that confrontation with both sides would compel the British to reinforce their troops in Palestine, and this in turn would have adverse consequences for the plan to demobilize military personnel.(37) Attlee persisted in his position even after being informed of Cunningham's warning that there was no possibility of holding additional illegal immigrants in Palestine and that, if more ships arrived, the situation would be intolerable.(38) The Prime Minister preferred to avoid taking any drastic action before Truman had made his decision on the Morrison-Grady plan.

Nevertheless, the heavy pressure exerted on the Cabinet by both the military and civilian authorities in Palestine finally tipped the scales at the Cabinet meeting on 30 July in favour of deporting illegal immigrants to Cyprus before they landed in Palestine. The change in position came after the ministers heard the report of Sir John Shaw, First Secretary of the Palestine Government, on expected Arab reactions if the illegal immigration continued. The vigorous support of the Chiefs of Staff for deportation and the Colonial Secretary's report on the viability of holding the illegals in Cyprus also influenced the ministers' stand. In view of the Prime Minister's absence, however, the Cabinet stopped short of a final decision.(39)

At the Cabinet meeting on 1 August 1946, Attlee expressed his fears that incidents might likely ensue from the deportation of the illegal immigrants and cause the British Government much embarrassment. Still, the Prime Minister did not speak categorically against deportation. Probably the decision of the American Cabinet on 30 July to put off any decision about the Morrison-Grady plan blunted Attlee's determination.(40) At the Cabinet meeting, the Colonial Secretary told of the arrival

`of yet another vessel, with 500 illegal immigrants, and referred to estimates that 2,000 more illegal immigrants were en route to Palestine. He also mentioned the possibility of detaining some 8,000-9,000 Jews in Cyprus. Without coming to a definite decision, the Cabinet instructed the Commander-in-Chief in the Middle East to prepare plans for deporting illegal immigrants to Cyprus, and the Colonial Secretary to complete preparations for their reception there.(41) From Palestine, High Commissioner Cunningham continued to urge the Cabinet to decide on deportation. He was not unaware that implementing this suggestion would create a critical situation in the Yishuv, which might resort to widespread disturbances, strikes, and hunger strikes, and therefore put an end to any chance of co-operating with the Zionists both in Palestine and, possibly, in Britain too. Nevertheless, he strongly argued, `It is better to deal first with the Jews rather than the Arabs, or Arabs and Jews together'.(42) Foreign Office officials put forth another argument. In order to obtain Arab approval of the Morrison-Grady plan, there was need to demonstrate to them that Britain was willing and able to carry out its obligations. `How can they have any faith in us', it was asked rhetorically, `if we show that we are unable to control illegal immigration?'(43)

The formal decision to deport the illegal immigrants to Cyprus was taken on 7 August, under pressure from military elements and government authorities in Palestine. The ministers were told that the only way to prevent an Arab uprising and a simultaneous war both with the Arabs and with the Jews was to deport the illegal immigrants. Furthermore, British military authorities in Palestine were prepared to implement the deportation and to face down any reaction from the Yishuv. The Cabinet, still hoping that Truman would decide to implement the Morrison-Grady plan, decided to delay announcing or putting the deportation policy into practice until the President had made a final decision. There were at that time 2,252 detainees in the camp at Atlit, while 2,232 more were being held on the deck of a ship in Haifa port, and, according to reports, yet another 2,500 illegal immigrants were en route to Palestine.(44)

Whitehall's hopes quickly vanished. On 12 August, Truman explained that in view of opposition in the United States to the Morrison-Grady plan, he was unable to support it. The following day, London published its new policy of deporting the illegal immigrants to Cyprus. The announcement sharply criticized the illegal immigration, stating it was not a spontaneous manifestation on the part of Jews for whom Palestine was their only hope, but a highly organized movement, the accusation read, led by `unscrupulous people' who were disobeying the laws of many lands and exploiting the distress of the refugees for their own political struggle over Palestine. The statement also blamed the illegal immigrants for exacerbating the tension between Arabs and Jews, some of whom were joining terrorist organizations in Palestine. The announcement clearly specified that the illegal immigrants would be held in detention camps in Cyprus until their future was decided.(45) The very next day, 754 illegal immigrants who had arrived from France and 536 who had come from Greece were deported to Cyprus.(46)

On the same day that Whitehall decided on deportation, Azzam called London's attention to the concern of the Arab League at the growing traffic of Jewish illegal immigrants. The majority of ship passengers to Palestine, he contended, `are not aged and helpless refugees but picked young men obviously chosen to provide recruits for

the Jewish armed forces'. Azzam had no doubt that the British Government could stop this traffic or at least reduce it to insignificant proportions. Although it might be difficult to prevent illegal immigrants from departing Europe from Palestine, the Secretary General of the Arab League maintained, `it is neither necessary nor just to allow ships intercepted en route to Palestine to complete their journey into Palestinian territorial waters and land their passengers'. According to Azzam, it was the British Government's responsibility `to take all steps in their power to prevent the illegal immigrants from landing in Palestine and to arrange that such immigrants be given asylum elsewhere'.(47) Britain's subsequent policy pronouncement was received with cautious satisfaction in the Arab countries. Palestinian Arabs, however, were more suspicious. They were of the opinion that if the British Government's intentions were sincere, they should have deported the Jews somewhere much farther than Cyprus, i.e. the countries from which they had embarked. Cyprus, in the Palestinian Arabs view, was but another staging point for Jewish immigration to Palestine.(48)

The decision on deportation to Cyprus in many respects marked a watershed. If not for the British Government's concern with fostering Anglo-American contacts on a solution to the Palestine question prior to Truman's view of the Morrison-Grady plan, the decision to deport the Jews would have been taken even sooner. The massive pressure that the Zionists had exerted in the summer of 1946 by means of the illegal immigration would not in itself have caused the British to ameliorate their immigration policy and to relax existing procedures for fear of Arab counter-measures. Following the blowing up of the King David Hotel, an act that greatly angered the Arabs, it was easier for the military to convince the Cabinet that Britain could look forward to more such grave incidents if harsher measures were not initiated against the illegal immigration.

Following Truman's rejection of the Morrison-Grady plan, Whitehall invited the Arab states, the Palestinians and the Zionists for consultation in London. The Zionists and the Palestinians refused to discuss the provincial-autonomy plan and boycotted the conference. The London conference, with the participation of Arab states alone, was conducted between 9 September and 2 October 1946. It became clear very quickly that a wide gap prevailed between the British and the Arab delegates; the latter rejected the Morrison-Grady plan. They also demanded the termination of the Mandate, the establishment of Palestine as a single independent state and the immediate end of Jewish immigration. Bevin explained that in light of world opinion and the prevailing situation in Palestine, it was not possible to accept the Arab stand.(49)

The day before the conference dispersed, an extensive discussion took place on the Jewish immigration issue. The Secretary to the Cabinet, Norman Brook, maintained that the British Government keenly appreciated the fears in the Arab world regarding unlimited Jewish immigration and said this immigration had to be subject to some measure of safeguard and control. The British Government had never suggested that Palestine alone could solve the whole of the problem of displaced Jews. In fact, Britain's attitude to this problem was that every effort had to be made to resettle displaced persons in Europe, including Jews, and the Government rejected the idea that all or even a substantial proportion of DPs should leave the continent. Nevertheless, it was recognized that there would be a number of DPs who could not be resettled in Europe, and for them a home would have to be found overseas. Even in

this case, Brook pointed out again, it was never suggested that Palestine should take in all or even a large percentage of these DPs. Yet, he concluded, the British Government, as the Mandatory Power, was under a particular obligation to take note of world opinion.

The Egyptian representative, Abdel Razzak Ahmed el Sanhouri Pasha, was not impressed by this argument. If Christians or Moslems had been persecuted, instead of Jews, he said, world opinion would not have been so interested in their fate. He suggested transferring to Palestine some two hundred thousand Muslim DPs from the Balkans, the Crimea and other parts of Russia. Could these Muslim DPs, he asked, `not be allotted to Palestine as her contribution to the problem?' Sanhouri did not leave any doubt as to the Arab countries' opposition to further Jewish immigration into Palestine, `which was already saturated with Jews'. The Arab delegations, he explained, could not return to their countries and say that they had agreed to the Jewish claims. The purpose of the Arab delegations was to achieve independence for Palestine, which had been under British mandate for 25 years, while the objective of the Jews `had always been to achieve Jewish domination of Palestine'. According to the Egyptian, the Jews would always be persecuted unless and until they were prepared to settle down as ordinary citizens wherever they might reside. The Arabs could not sacrifice their country because the Jews were being persecuted.

Dr Fadhel Jamali of Iraq stressed that immigration was the keynote of the conference and that the peace of the Middle East and the faith of the Middle East peoples in Britain were at stake. The objective of the Jews in Palestine was political, and every single Jew who entered the country was a potential terrorist or usurper. Jamali demanded that the refugee problem be separated from the Palestine problem. The Iraqi representative also tried to belittle the tragedy of the Jews by arguing that according to a recent report (which he did not specify), the Jews had not suffered more than the Poles and the Czechs. Zionist propaganda had magnified the extent of Jewish suffering. Nothing had been heard, he continued, of the maltreatment of Muslims in Yugoslavia by General Tito. World opinion, he commented, `should be freed from bias and distortion'. The Transjordan representative, Samir Pasha Rifai, emphasized the damage that the Jewish immigration issue was causing to relations between the Arab countries and Britain. Azzam came up with the idea of moving the Jewish DPs to Eastern Siberia, where there was a Jewish republic that was an autonomous state in the Soviet Union; after all, he reasoned, the Jews were not anti-Russian and the Soviet Government was also opposed to Zionist policy in Palestine.(50)

The London Conference illuminated once again the prime importance that the Arabs ascribed to the immigration. Under the circumstances, all Zionist efforts to influence the British to alter or at least moderate their immigration policy came to nothing. Whitehall recognized that as long as the deportations to Cyprus continued, tension between the Yishuv and both the Mandatory authorities and Whitehall would persist, and the Jews would increasingly be inclined to break away from Britain.(51) Zionist leaders made it clear that a change in the immigration policy would help relax tension in Palestine and advance negotiations on the participation of a Zionist delegation at a conference on Palestine to be convened by the British. The new Colonial Secretary, Creech Jones, explained to the Zionists that the question of immigration to Palestine would constitute one of the main topics of discussion at the proposed conference and

that it was not possible to introduce a change at this stage because of the probable firm reaction by the Arabs.(52) The only compromise that the British were willing to make was the allocation of half of the monthly quota of immigration certificates to illegal immigrants detained in Cyprus.(53) Such a move did not constitute a departure from the existing immigration policy, but at the same time it eased the shortage of internment space. This gesture of the Colonial Office was received with indifference by most of the Jewish public in Palestine, since the deportations to Cyprus continued. London remained adamant, even though it was aware that the cessation of the deportations and the transfer of the immigrants from Cyprus to detention camps in Palestine would likely help Britain's struggle against the terrorist operations of IZL and LEHI. (Between 1 October and 18 November 1946, 99 British soldiers and policemen were killed in Palestine by the two organizations.)(54)

For their part, the Arabs continued to apply pressure on London not to make any concessions on Jewish immigration. The Council of the Arab League decided on 28 November 1946 that the continuation of Jewish immigration to Palestine constituted a violation of the commitment made by the British government in 1939 and, therefore, it endangered the peace in the Middle East. `In fact', the Arab League statement read, `the Arabs see in all kinds of Jewish immigration into Palestine an illegal action. They do not approve of what the British Government calls legal immigration quotas. Consequently, they consider all Jews entering Palestine as illegal immigrants who should be sent back to where they came from.(55) The High Commissioner in Palestine reported to the Colonial Office that even forcing the illegal vessels to Cyprus did not satisfy the Palestinian Arabs, who accused the Mandatory government of aiding the illegal embarkations and threatened to put an end to the prevailing quiet in the region.(56)

Britain's last major effort to reach a compromise between the contradicting aims of the Jews and the Arabs took place in London (27 January-13 February 1947). The British conducted parallel negotiations with delegations from Arab countries and the Zionist delegation. The gap between the parties proved unbridgeable, the controversy over Jewish immigration forming one of the main obstacles. In a final endeavour to break the impasse, the British suggested what became known as the Bevin plan for a resolution of the Palestine question. The plan called for a five-year trusteeship, at the end of which period an independent state would be established in which an Arab majority was assured. The plan attempted to combine the idea of provincial autonomy, preferred by the British, with the Arab demand for an unitary state. In order to placate the Jews and, more important, Truman, the plan spoke of the immigration of 96,000 Jews to Palestine over a two-year period. Until the end of the trusteeship, the High Commissioner, together with an Advisory Council, would continue to determine the extent of immigration in keeping with the economic absorption capacity of the country.(57)

Both the Arabs and the Jews rejected the plan. The Arabs rejected it because they thought it would lead to partition, namely, the establishment of a Jewish state in Palestine. They also firmly rejected the proposal for bringing 96,000 Jewish immigrants to Palestine. The Zionists rejected it, since it would perpetuate the Jews as a minority in an Arab country. The Zionists wanted the creation of a sovereign Jewish state. Under the circumstances, the Cabinet meeting on 14 February accepted the recommendations of the Foreign Secretary and the Colonial Secretary to transfer the

Palestine question to the United Nations.(58) This far-reaching decision, however, was not meant to imply that Britain was relinquishing its mandate. Still, this step entailed a considerable risk of that occurring.

Bevin and Creech Jones had no doubts that the Cabinet decision would lead to an intensification of Zionist activity. They drew the other ministers' attention to the forthcoming critical period, up to September 1947, when there would be a debate on the Palestine question in the United Nations. Bevin and Creech Jones estimated that with improved weather, the extent of the illegal immigration would increase and that continued deportation to Cyprus would cause an intensification of incidents and terrorist activity on the part of the Jews in Palestine. Despite these fears, the Cabinet was persuaded by Bevin and Attlee to reject the recommendations and appeals of the Americans, in particular those of the new Secretary of State, George C. Marshall, to increase the monthly immigration quota.(59) Whitehall held to its positions although the ministers recognized that the illegal immigration was the only subject on which the entire Jewish community in Palestine was united and that the deportation of the illegal immigrants attenuated the Jewish Agency's ability to act against Jewish terrorism. `Every time an illegal immigrant ship enters Haifa', the High Commissioner told London, the `whole of [the] Yishuv is immediately plunged into an intense state of hysterical emotional tension'.(60)

British representatives in Arab countries made sure to counter the Zionists' pressure. They warned London of the dangers inherent in increasing the quota to 4,000 a month. Any concession on immigration, it was pointed out, would be interpreted that `we were being blackmailed by threats of increased terrorism' and would encourage terrorist attacks against British lives and property in several Arab countries.(61) The High Commissioner in Palestine doubted the British diplomats' assessments. He thought that the reaction of the Palestine Arabs to a modest increase would not be strong and asked `why it should be stronger among Arabs outside Palestine'. Disturbed by the increase in terrorist attacks, Cunningham maintained that `without an increase, there is little prospect of stopping terrorism by any military or other action short of war with the Jews'.(62) The Cabinet Defence Committee preferred not to instigate the Arabs. The Minister of Defence warned that any increase in immigration would result in active resistance by the Arabs and that the present British force in Palestine, if not heavily reinforced, would be unable to face active opposition by both Jews and Arabs.(63)

Following the boarding of three vessels with close to 2,800 illegal immigrants in February 1947, British officials concluded that deportation to Cyprus was not deterring either the organizers or the illegal immigrants themselves. Several officials thought that no choice remained but to deport the illegal immigrants to their ports of embarkation. Such a move, it was believed, might also deter the governments of Italy and France from allowing illegal immigrants' vessels to sail from their ports.(64) A few months passed before London finally decided to implement this counter-measure. Meanwhile, Arab pressure to cease Jewish immigration altogether continued. At a meeting of Arab Foreign Ministers in June, Britain was called on to bring an immediate and complete halt to immigration, both legal and illegal. A secret decision reached at the meeting was to encourage illegal Arab immigration into Palestine in order to offset the illegal Jewish immigration.(65)

The most famous and serious clash between the British and the Zionists over the illegal immigration was the case of the President Warfield (later known as the Exodus 1947). On 11 July 1947 the Exodus embarked from Sete in France with 4,530 illegal immigrants aboard. This sailing was a bitter setback for the British, particularly for Bevin, who had invested great effort in attempting to prevent the vessel's departure. The French government, under heavy pressure from the British, decided to permit the illegal immigrants to disembark elsewhere in France and to supply all their needs; however, the French government made it clear that it was unequivocally opposed to the use of force to offload the illegal immigrants. Efforts to convince the refugees, who reached Port de Bouc in three British deportations ships, to disembark of their own free will came to naught. About three weeks after the Exodus sailed from France, Bevin was forced to recognize the failure of his order to return the illegal immigrants to their port of embarkation. On 8 September, the illegal immigrants were offloaded from the three deportation ships in the port of Hamburg.(66) Three weeks later, on 20 September 1947, the British Cabinet decided to evacuate Palestine. This decision was mainly the result of a majority recommendation by the United Nations Special Committee on Palestine (UNSCOP. 31 August 1947) to partition Palestine between the Jews and the Arabs. UNSCOP had been, in large measure, Whitehall's last remaining hope to help extricate Britain from the stalemate in which it found itself in the attempt to devise a solution for the Palestine question that would be acceptable both to the Arab countries and to the Americans. The UNSCOP report put an end to those hopes.(67)

Following the Cabinet decision, more and more voices began to be heard in government circles, particularly in the Colonial Office, advocating an end to the struggle against the illegal immigration. In their view, persisting in that struggle was no longer worthwhile. Bevin, who strongly opposed this approach, insisted that as long as Britain was responsible for the administration of Palestine, the battle against illegal immigration should continue. The Cabinet Defence Committee accepted Bevin's position at its meeting on 1 November.(68) Four weeks later, on 29 November 1947, the General Assembly of the United Nations voted to divide Palestine into Jewish and Arab states. The Jews enthusiastically approved the plan while the Arabs firmly rejected it. Riots against the United States broke out in several Arab countries while in Palestine armed fighting began between Arabs and Jewish residents. The Arab League threatened to use force in order to block the division of Palestine.(69)

In London, Whitehall continued its debate over the policy to be pursued until British forces were withdrawn from Palestine. The Secretary-General of the Arab League asked the British not only to proceed with preventing illegal immigration, but also to take pains `that legal immigrants that during the time Britain continued to be responsible for Palestine should include a considerable proportion of old persons, women and children'.(70) The Colonial Office, though, believed that the ongoing preventive measures, including deportations to Cyprus, would signal Britain's intention to negate the recommendation of the United Nations; this would then constitute an incentive to increase the scope of illegal immigration and lead to an inundation of the camps in Cyprus within a very short time. Under such circumstances, the Colonial Office argued, it would be very difficult to move the detained illegal immigrants in Cyprus to Palestine before the evacuation of British forces, which was scheduled to be completed by 1 August 1948. Furthermore, the detention of illegal immigrants in the Cyprus camps was costing the Mandatory

Government about 250,000 [pounds sterling] per month, an expense that would empty its coffers. If, on the other hand, the Jewish Agency were permitted to transfer to Palestine up to 6,500 persons a month -- as the UN had recommended -- illegal immigration would probably come to an end and, with that, the evacuation of the Cyprus camps would be made possible. The High Commissioner maintained that if the immigration quota to Palestine were increased, it would constitute compensation for Britain's failure to adopt the UN recommendation that, no later than 1 February 1948, the Jews be assigned a port through which they would be allowed unlimited immigration. For their part, the Foreign and War Offices feared that a change in policy `would lead to trouble with the Arabs which might have more serious consequences for our withdrawal than a continued application of the policy of controlling immigration'.(71) The Foreign Office also rejected a suggestion by the State Department that the illegal immigrants held in Cyprus be allowed to enter Palestine before the end of the Mandate in exchange for a Zionist promise to stop the illegal sailings.(72)

Britain persisted in its efforts to thwart illegal immigration until the very end of the Mandate. Its diplomatic campaign against the countries from whose ports the illegal immigrants sailed and against the flag states of the transport vessels involved also continued unabated. During the half year that elapsed between the UN General Assembly's decision at the end of November 1947 to partition Palestine and the establishment of the State of Israel in May 1948, the British deported to Cyprus 22,384 illegal immigrants on twelve vessels. As late as April 1948, three ships with immigrants were diverted to the island.

Britain's determination to preserve its position in the Middle East governed Whitehall's policy on Jewish immigration to Palestine both during and after the Second World War. London recognized that the decline in Britain's standing in the international arena following the war necessitated its favourable consideration of Arab demands. The Arabs succeeded in making the question of Jewish immigration, and that of the illegal immigrants in particular, a test case for British-Arab relations. While the illegal immigration caused Britain considerable difficulties, especially from the summer of 1946, the pressure generated by these sailings could not match that exerted by the Arabs. Whitehall's refusal to increase the immigration quotas or to halt deportations to Cyprus as well as its continued struggle against the illegal sailings even after the UN decision on establishing a Jewish state reflected the British Government's order of priorities. Fear of riots by Palestinian Arabs which would likely erupt -- with the support and aid of the various Arab countries -- neutralized any possible counter-measures by the Zionists.

All in all, there were no clear winners in the struggle over Jewish immigration. Britain succeeded in apprehending and deporting to detention camps in Cyprus and Germany most of the illegal immigrants, about 51,000 of the approximately 70,000 Jewish refugees who had embarked for Palestine. The number of most of the rest who were caught but allowed into the country was deducted from the official immigration quota. Very quickly London recognized that deportation to Cyprus was not in itself sufficient to end or even to limit the scope of illegal sailings; furthermore, the shortage of places of detention became more and more acute as time passed. The decision to send the illegal immigrants back to the ports from which they had embarked was, to a great extent, an admission of the failure of the Cyprus deterrent. Still, the deportations

almost certainly obviated harsher reaction by the Arabs. From the Zionist perspective, British actions against the illegal immigration sometimes received worldwide media coverage, thereby helping the Zionists to prevent the Jewish DP problem from sinking into oblivion, especially in 1947, when international interest in the subject waned. In the end, the fact that tens of thousands of refugees had set sail for Palestine was in itself a considerable achievement, especially since all the detainees eventually reached Palestine/Israel.

NOTES

(1.) Michael J. Cohen, Palestine.' Retreat from the Mandate The Making of British Policy, 1936-1945 (New York, 1978), chapters 2-5; Barry Rubin, The Arab States and the Palestine Conflict (Syracuse, 1981), pp.66-116; Walid Khalidi, `The Arab Perspective', in Wm. Roger Louis and Robert W. Stookey (eds.), The End of the Palestine Mandate (London, 1986), pp. 104-7; Fred M. Gottheil, `Arab Immigration into Pre-State Israel: 1922-1931', in Elie Kedourie and Sylvia G. Haim (eds.), Palestine and Israel in the 19th and 20th Centuries (London, 1992), pp.143-52.

(2.) PRO, CAB129/2, report by the Lord Chancellor of the Council, C.P. (45) 156, 8 Sept. 1945; see also PRO, FO266/277, minutes of a meeting held at the Foreign Office, 6 Sept. 1945; PRO, FO371/45379/6953, minutes of the Cabinet Palestine Committee, P.(M)(45) 1st meeting, 6 Sept. 1945.

(3.) PRO, CAB95/14, memorandum by the Secretary of State for the Colonies, P.(M)(45) 10, 1 Sept. 1945.

(4.) PRO, FO800/475, Grafftey-Smith to FO, no.471, 14 Oct. 1945; PRO, FO800/1475, FO to Jedda, no.492, 12 Oct. 1945; about the Arab League see Roger Wm. Louis, The British Empire in the Middle East 1945-1951 (Oxford, 1984), pp.128-46; Ahmad D. Gomma, The Foundation of the League of the Arab States (London, 1978), Part III.

(5.) PRO, CAB95/14, note by the Secretary of State for India and Burma, P(M)(45) 14, 6 Oct. 1945.

(6.) Khalidi, `The Arab Perspective', pp.108-109.

(7.) PRO, WO32/10260, brief for the Secretary of State for Defense, 10 Oct. 1945.

(8.) PRO, FO371/45380/E7599, Halifax to FO, no.6593, 3 Oct. 1945.

(9.) PRO, CAB128/1, Cabinet Conclusions, 38th (45), 4 Oct. 1945; PRO, WO32/10260, extract from the conclusions of the 40th (45) meeting of the Cabinet, 11 Oct. 1945.

(10.) PRO, PREM8/627, Halifax to FO, nos. 7013, 7037, 22 Oct. 1945.

(11.) PRO, PREM8/627, Halifax to FO, no.7157, 27 Oct. 1945.

(12.) PRO, FO371/45383/E8342, FO to Washington, no.994, 1 Nov. 1945.

(13.) Hansard, Parliamentary Debates, Vol.415, Cols. 1930-1934.

(14.) Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States, Harry S. Truman. 1945 (Washington, 1961), no.187.

(15.) PRO, WO169/19745, HQ Palestine, `Situation in Palestine', 19 Dec, 1945; se also PRO, WO169/19745, Fortnightly Intelligence Newsletter No.3, issued by British Troops in Palestine and Transjordan (for period 24 Nov.-7 Dec. 1945).

(16.) PRO, FO371/45407/E10197, Cunningham to Secretary of State, Colonies, no.1817, 21 Dec. 1945; about the Palestinian Arabs' stand see Joseph Nevo, `The Arabs of Palestine 1947-1948: Military and Political Activity', **Middle Eastern Studies**, Vol.23, No.3 (Jan. 1987), pp.3-38.

(17.) PRO, CAB128/5, Cabinet Meeting, 1 Jan. 1946; see also PRO, FO371/45407/E10160, FO to Cairo, no.10, 2 Jan. 1946.

(18.) PRO, FO371/52507/E879, Creech Jones to Foreign Secretary, 23 Jan. 1946; see also PRO, PREM8/627, Hall to the Prime Minister, 15 Jan. 1946.

(19.) PRO, CO537/1768, FO to Cairo, no.143, 28 Jan. 1946; Haim Levenberg, Military Preparations of the Arab Community in Palestine 1945-1948 (London, 1993), pp.13-16.

(20.) PRO, WO169/23021, Fortnightly Intelligence Newsletter no.5, issued by HQ British Troops in Palestine and Transjordan (for period 22 Dec. 1945-4 Jan. 1946); PRO, WO169/19745, Fortnightly Intelligence Newsletter no.5, issued by HQ British Troops in Palestine and Transjordan (for period 24 Nov.-7 Dec. 1945); PRO, WO169/19745, HQ Palestine, `Situation in Palestine', 19 Dec. 1945.

(21.) PRO, FO371/52508/E1034, Lord Killearn to FO, no.150, 31 Jan. 1946.

(22.) Mordechai Naor, The Ha'apala 1934-1948 (Tel Aviv, 1948), appendix (Hebrew).

(23.) Report of the Anglo-American Committee of Enquiry regarding the Problems of European Jewry and Palestine (Lausanne, 20 April 1946), Cmd.6808, p. 2.

(24.) PRO, FO371/52516/E3663, Grafftey-Smith to FO, no.159, 23 April 1946: PRO, FO371/52519/E3867, Grafftey-Smith to FO, no.163, 29 April 1946.

(25.) PRO, FO371/52516/E3756, Baghdad to FO, no.331, 25 April 1946.

(26.) PRO, CAB129/9, report of ad hoc official committee, C.P.(46) 173, 26 April 1946; PRO, WO32/10260, extract from the minutes of the 14th (46) meeting of the Defence Committee, 24 April 1946; PRO, CAB129/9, report by the Chiefs of Staff, 26 April 1946; on the Palestinian Arabs' reaction to the report see Levenberg, Military Preparations of the Arab Community in Palestine 1945-1948, pp.24-6.

(27.) Foreign Relations of the United States, Vol. VII, pp.588-9, Dean Acheson to Byrnes, 30 April 1946; Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States, no.92.

(28.) PRO, FO371/52520/E3983, FO to Paris, no.41, 1 May 1946; PRO, FO371/52510/E3921, Paris to FO, no.26, 30 April 1946.

(29.) Thomas Mayer, 'Arab Unity of Action and the Palestine Question, 1945-48', **Middle Eastern Studies**, Vol.22, No.3 (1986), pp.337-8; Michael Cohen, Palestine and the Great Powers 1945-1948 (Princeton, 1982), pp.119-20, 192-3; Amikam Nachmani, Great Power Discord in Palestine (London, 1987), pp.205-10; Khalidi, 'The Arab Perspective', pp.110-12; on the Arab Higher Committee's reaction see, PRO, PREM8/627, memorandum by the Secretary of State for the Colonies, C.P. (46) 220, 6 June 1946.

(30.) PRO, CAB127/270, Attlee to Truman, 9 May 1946; PRO, FO371/52523/E4345, FO to Washington, no.4452, 9 May 1946; PRO, CAB127/270, Truman to Attlee, 17 May 1946: PRO, CAB128/5, Cabinet conclusions, 20 May 1946.

(31.) PRO, CAB129/11, report by the Chiefs of Staff, C.P. (46) 267, 10 July 1946.

(32.) PRO, FO371/52537/E6383, Cunningham to CO, no.1104, 5 July 1946; about the 'Black Saturday' see Cohen, Palestine and the Great Powers, pp.81-90.

(33.) PRO, CAB128/6, Cabinet meeting C.M.67 (46), 11 July 1946.

(34.) St. Anthony's College, Oxford, Middle East Centre (hereafter SACMEC), Alan Cunningham's Papers, box 1, file 1, Cunningham to CO, no.1197, 24 July 1946; SACMEC, Alan Cunningham's Papers, box 1, file 1, Cunningham to CO, no.1212, 25 July 1946.

(35.) The Morrison-Grady plan called for the division of Palestine into four areas: Arab and Jewish provinces, a district of Jerusalem, and a district of the Negev. According to the plan, the provincial governments would be responsible for the administration of internal matters while the central government, under a British High Commissioner, would rule the Jerusalem enclave and the Negev region directly as well as retain sole authority over Palestine in different areas, foremost being defence and foreign relations. As for immigration, it was decided that 100,000 Jewish DPs would be allowed to enter during the first year; thereafter, the central government would regulate immigration. PRO, CAB 129/12, Statement of Policy, 26 July 1946.

(36.) PRO, CAB128/6, Cabinet meeting, 25 July 1946.

(37.) PRO 128/6, Cabinet meeting, 29 July 1946; PRO, FO800/485, FO to Paris, no.714, 29 July 1946.

(38.) PRO, FO371/52545/E7266, Paris to FO, no.409, 30 July 1946.

(39.) PRO, CAB128/6, Cabinet meeting, C.M.46, 30 July 1946; see also Chiefs of Staff, 118th meeting, 29 July 1946.

(40.) PRO, PREM8/627, Paris to Attlee, no.415, 31 July 1946; PRO, CAB127/280, Truman to Attlee, 8 Aug. 1946.

(41.) PRO, CAB128/6, Cabinet meeting, 1 Aug. 1946.

(42.) PRO, FO371/52627/E7703, Cunningham to Secretary of State for Colonies, no.1272, 3 Aug. 1946.

(43.) PRO, FO371/52550/E7611, memorandum for the Secretary of State, 6 Aug. 1946.

(44.) PRO, FO371/52627/E7704, Cabinet meeting, C.M. (46) 77th conclusions, 7 Aug. 1946.

(45.) PRO, WO275/63, 'Deportation', 13 Aug. 1946.

(46.) PRO, FO371/52628/E7943, Cunningham to CO, no.1297, 10 Aug. 1946: PRO FO371/52628/E7946, Cunningham to CO, no.1309, 13 Aug. 1946.

(47.) PRO, FO141/1104, Azzam to Ronald I. Cambell, British ambassador in Cairo, 12 Aug. 1946.

(48.) PRO, FO371/52629/E8123, Baghdad to FO, no.660, 17 Aug. 1946; PRO, WO275/63, Fortnightly Intelligence Newsletter no.22 issued by HQ British Troops in Palestine and Transjordan (for period 5-18 Aug. 1946); PRO ADM1/19615, Commander, Royal Navy, to National Officer-in-Charge, Port Said, 11 Sept. 1946.

(49.) PRO, FO371/52644/E9394, minutes of the 6th meeting, 29 Sept. 1946; Levenberg, Military Preparations of the Arab Community in Palestine 1945-.1948, pp.54-63; Cohen, Palestine and the Great Powers, pp.197-202.

(50.) PRO, FO371/52645/E9846, notes of meeting of the Palestine Conference Committee, 1 Oct. 1946.

(51.) PRO, CAB127/280, Cunningham to CO, no.1721, 21 Oct. 1946.

(52.) Central Zionist Archives (Jerusalem), Z-4/302/31, minutes of a meeting in the Colonial Office, 8 Oct. 1946.

(53.) PRO, FO371/52646/E1114, CO to Cunningham, no.2177, 9 Nov. 1946; SACMEC, Alan Cunningham's Papers, box 1, file 2, Cunningham to CO, no.2120, 19 Oct. 1946: PRO, FO371/52551/E10554, Cunningham to CO, no.1719, 21 Oct. 1946.

(54.) PRO, CO537/1728, Cunningham to CO, no.2003, 29 Nov. 1946; PRO, CO537/1728, Cunningham to CO, no.2023, 29 Nov. 1946.

(55.) PRO, FO141/1104, Azzam Pasha to R.J. Bowker, Charge d'Affaires, British Embassy, Cairo, 7 Dec. 1946.

(56.) PRO, CO537/1727, Cunningham to CO, no.2023, 3 Dec. 1946: PRO, CO537/1727, Cunningham to CO, no.2187, 24 Dec. 1946.

(57.) Richard L. Jasse, `Great Britain and Palestine towards the United Nations', **Middle Eastern Studies**, Vol.30, No.3 (July 1994), pp.560-69; Cohen, Palestine and the Great Powers, pp.217-21; Ritchie Ovendale, Britain, the United States, and the End of the Palestine Mandate, 1942-1948 (Woodbridge, Suffolk, 1989), pp.191-5.

(58.) PRO, CAB129/17, Cabinet Meeting, C.M.22 (47), 14 Feb. 1947; PRO CAB129/17, memorandum by the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs and the Secretary for the Colonies, C.P. (47) 59, 13 Feb. 1947; Jasse, `Great Britain and Palestine towards the United Nations', pp.558-69.

(59.) PRO, FO371/61767/E1442, Washington to FO, no.996, 15 Feb. 1947: PRO CAB128/9, Cabinet meeting, C.M.23 (47), 18 Feb. 1947.

(60.) PRO, CO537/2333, Cunningham to CO, no.348, 16 Feb. 1947.

(61.) PRO, FO371/61905/E2114, Baghdad to FO, no.230, 10 March 1947; PRO, FO371/61905/E2055, Jedda to FO, no.97, 9 March 1947; PRO, FO371/61905/E2125, Cairo to FO, no.610, 9 March 1947; PRO, FO371/61905/E2144, Damascus to FO, no.64, 8 March 1947; PRO, FO371/61905/E2056, Beirut to FO, no.171, 8 March 1947.

(62.) PRO, FO371/61905/E2852, Cunning, ham to CO, no.544, 13 March 1947.

(63.) PRO, W032/10260, extract from the minutes of the 7th meeting of the Defence Committee, 12 March 1947.

(64.) PRO, WO32/10260, extract from the meeting of the 7th (471 meeting of the Defence Committee, 12 March 1947.

(65.) PRO, FO371/61875/E5237, Cairo to FO, no.1374, 16 June 1947; PRO, FO371/61875/ E5181, Baghdad to FO, no.546, 16 June 1947.

(66.) Arieh J. Kochavi, `Britain and the Illegal Immigration to Palestine from France Following World War II', Holocaust and Genocide Studies, Vol.6, No.4 (1991), pp. 383-96.

(67.) Louis, The British Empire in the Middle East 1945-1951, part IV, chapter 5; on the Arab reaction to UNSCOP see Mayer, `Arab Unity of Action and the Palestine Question, 1945-48'; Nevo, `The Arabs of Palestine 1947-1948', pp.7-8, 26-7.

(68.) PRO, PREM8/859, Cabinet Defence Committee, 1 Nov. 1947.

(69.) Cohen, Palestine and the Great Powers, chapter 12; Rubin, The Arab States and the Palestine Conflict, chapter 12.

(70.) PRO, FO371/61890/E11271, Jedda to FO, no.389, 29 Nov. 1947.

(71.) PRO, FO371/61833, CO to Cunningham, no.3155, 6 Dec. 1947; PRO, FO371/61833. Cunningham to CO, no.2356, 7 Dec. 1947; PRO FO371/61833, FO to Washington, no. 13177, 20 Dec. 1947; PRO, FO371/61833/E11788, note for the

Colonial Office about the policy of H.M.G. with regard to Jewish immigration, 10 Dec. 1947.

(72.) PRO, FO371/61833/E12231, Washington to FO, no.7167, 23 Dec. 1947.